We study the problem of distribution testing when the samples can only be accessed using a locally differentially private mechanism and focus on two representative testing questions of identity (goodness-of-fit) and independence testing for discrete distributions. We are concerned with two settings: First, when we insist on using an already deployed, general-purpose locally differentially private mechanism such as the popular Rappor or the recently introduced Hadamard Response for collecting data, and must build our tests based on the data collected via this mechanism; and second, when no such restriction is imposed, and we can design a bespoke mechanism specifically for testing. For the latter purpose, we introduce the Randomized Aggregated Private Testing Optimal Response (Raptor) mechanism which is remarkably simple and requires only one bit of communication per sample.
Introduction
Locally differentially private (LDP) mechanisms have gained prominence as methods of choice for sharing sensitive data with untrusted curators. This strong notion of privacy, introduced in [DJW13] (see also [EGS03] ) as a variant of differential privacy [DMNS06, Dwo06] , requires each user to report only a noisy version of its data such that the distribution of the reported data does not change multiplicatively beyond a prespecified factor when the underlying user data changes. With the proliferation of user data accumulated using such locally private mechanisms, there is an increasing demand for designing data analytics toolkits for operating on the collated user data. In this paper, we consider the design of algorithms aimed at providing a basic ability to such a toolkit, namely the ability to run statistical tests for the underlying user data distribution. At a high-level, we seek to address the following question.
How should one conduct statistical testing on the (sensitive) data of users, such that each user maintains their own privacy both to the outside world and to the (untrusted) curator performing the inference?
In particular, we consider two fundamental statistical inference problems for a discrete distribution over a large alphabet: identity testing (goodness-of-fit) and independence testing. A prototypical example of the former is testing whether the user data was generated from a uniform distribution; the latter tests if two components of user data vectors are independent. Our main focus is the uniformity testing problem and most of the other results are obtained as an extension using similar techniques. We seek algorithms that are efficient in the number of LDP user data samples required and can be implemented practically. These two problems are instances of distribution testing, a sub-area of statistical hypothesis testing focusing on small-sample analysis introduced by Batu et al. [BFR + 00] and Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Ron [GGR98] .
Our results are comprehensive, and organized along two axes: First, we consider tests that use existing LDP data release mechanisms to collect inputs at the center and perform a post-processing test on this aggregated data. Specifically, we consider the popular Rappor mechanism of [EPK14] and the recently introduced the Hadamard Response mechanism (HR) of [ASZ18] . Because these mechanisms have utility beyond our specific use-case of distribution testing -Rappor, for instance, is already deployed in many applications -it is natural to build a more comprehensive data analytics toolkit using the data accumulated by these mechanisms. To this end, we provide uniformity testing algorithms with optimal sample complexity for both mechanisms; further, for HR, we also provide an independence testing algorithm and analyze its performance.
Second, we consider the more general class of public-coin mechanisms for solving testing problems which are allowed to use public randomness. We present a new response mechanism, Randomized Aggregated Private Testing Optimal Response (Raptor), that only requires users to send a single privatized bit indicating whether their data point is in a (publicly known) random subset of the domain. Using Raptor, we obtain simple algorithms for uniformity and independence testing that are sample-optimal even among public-coin mechanisms.
We next provide a detailed description of our results, followed by a discussion of the relevant literature to put them in perspective. At the outset we mention that the problems studied here have been introduced earlier in [She18, GR18] . Our algorithms outperform their counterparts from these papers, and we complement them with information-theoretic lower bounds establishing their optimality (except for the proposed HR-based independence test).
Algorithms and results
The privacy level of a locally private mechanism is often parameterized by a single parameter ε > 0. Specifically, an ε-LDP mechanism (cf. Duchi et al. [DJW13] ) ensures that for any two distinct values of user data, the distribution of the output reported to the curator is within a multiplicative factor of e ε ; smaller values of ε indicate stronger privacy guarantees. In this work, we focus on the high-privacy regime, and assume throughout that ε ∈ (0, 1]; however, our choice of 1 as an upper bound is to set a convention and can be replaced with any constant.
In uniformity testing, the user data comprises independent samples from an unknown k-ary distribution. These samples are then made available to the curator through an ε-LDP mechanism, and she seeks to determine if the underlying distribution was uniform or γ-far from uniform in total variation distance. How many locally private samples must the curator access?
First, we consider two representative locally private mechanisms, Rappor and HR. We briefly describe these mechanisms here informally and provide a more complete definition in Section 2. In Rappor, the k-ary observation of the user is first converted to a k-length vector using one-hot encoding, and then each bit of this vector is independently flipped with probability 1/(1 + e ε ). HR, on the other hand, is a generalization of the classic Randomized Response (RR) [War65] which roughly maps each k-ary observation x to either a randomly chosen +1 entry of the x-th row of the k × k Hadamard matrix with probability e ε /(1 + e ε ), or to a randomly chosen −1 entry with probability 1/(1+e ε ). Interestingly, both these mechanisms have been shown recently to be sampleoptimal for learning k-ary distributions; see [DJW17, EPK14, WHW + 16, YB17, KBR16, ASZ18] . Further, note that both Rappor and HR are private-coin mechanisms, and are symmetric across users.
We propose the following algorithm to enable uniformity testing using data obtained via Rappor. Once again, the description here is brief and a formal description is provided in Section 3.1.
Algorithm 1 Uniformity testing using Rappor
1: Obtain Z 1 , . . . , Z n using Rappor.
2:
For each x in [k], compute the number N x of k-bit vectors Z i for which the x-th entry is 1.
3: Compute the test statistic T described in (11) which is, in essence, a bias-corrected version of the collision statistic x (N 2 x − N x ). 4: If T is more than roughly n 2 γ 2 ε 2 /k, declare uniform; else declare not uniform.
We analyze the sample complexity of the above test and show that it is order-wise optimal among all tests that use Rappor.
Result 1 (Sample complexity of uniformity testing using Rappor). The uniformity test described above requires O(k 3/2 /(γ 2 ε 2 )) samples. Furthermore, any test using Rappor must use Ω(k 3/2 /(γ 2 ε 2 )) samples.
Moving now to HR, denote by q * the output distribution of HR when the underlying samples are generated from the uniform distribution. (Note that q * can be computed explicitly.) Invoking Parseval's theorem, we show that the ℓ 2 distance between the q * and the output distribution of HR is roughly ε/ √ k times the ℓ 2 distance between the uniform and the user data distributions. This motivates the following test. ; the symbol (resp. ) indicates a symmetric (resp. asymmetric) mechanism. Finally, ⋆ indicates that the upper bound is tight (in all parameters) for the subclass of private mechanisms our mechanisms belong to.
Proof techniques
We start by describing the analysis of our tests based on existing ε-LDP mechanisms. Recall that a standard (non-private) uniformity test entails estimating the ℓ 2 norm of the underlying distribution by counting the number of collisions in the observed samples. When applying the same idea on the data collected via Rappor, we can naively try to estimate the number of collisions by adding the number of pairs of output vectors with 1s in the x-th coordinate, for each x. However, the resulting statistic has a prohibitively high variance stemming from the noise added by Rappor. We fix this shortcoming by considering a bias-corrected version of this statistic that closely resembles the classic χ 2 statistic. However, analyzing the variance of this new statistic turns out to be rather technical and involves handling the covariance of quadratic functions of correlated binomial random variables. Our main technical effort in this part goes into analyzing this covariance, which may find further applications.
For our second test that builds on HR, we follow a different approach. In this case, we exploit the structure of Hadamard transform and take recourse to Parseval's theorem to show that the ℓ 2 distance to uniformity of the original distribution p is equal, up to an ε/ √ k factor, to the ℓ 2 distance of the Fourier transform H(p) to some (explicit) fixed distribution q; further, it can be shown that q 2 = O(1/ √ k). With this structural result in hand, we can test identity of H(p) to q in the Fourier domain, by invoking the non-private ℓ 2 tester of Chan et al. [CDVV14] with the corresponding distance parameter γε/ √ k. Exploiting the fact that q has a small ℓ 2 norm leads to the stated sample complexity.
Our private-coin mechanism for independence testing uses HR as well, and once again hinges on the idea that testing and learning in the Fourier domain can be done efficiently. To wit, we adapt the "testing-by-learning" framework of Acharya, Daskalakis, and Kamath [ADK15] (which they show can be applied to many testing problems, including independence testing) to our private setting. The main insight here is that instead of using HR to learn and test the original distribution p in χ 2 distance, we perform both operations directly in the transformed domain to the distribution at the output of HR. Namely, we first learn the transform of p 1 ⊗p 2 , then test whether the outcome is close to the transform of p. The main challenge here is to show that the variant of Hadamard transform that we use preserves (as was the case for uniformity testing) the ℓ 2 distance from independence. We believe this approach to be quite general, as was the case in [ADK15] , and that it can be used to tackle many other distribution testing questions such as locally private testing of monotonicity or log-concavity.
As mentioned above, our main results -the optimal public-coin mechanisms for identity and independence testing -are remarkably simple. The key heuristic underlying both can be summarized as follows: If p is γ-far from uniform, then with constant probability a uniformly random subset S ⊆ [k] of size k/2 will satisfy p(S) = 1/2 ± Ω(γ/ √ k); on the other hand, if p is uniform then p(S) = 1/2 always holds. Thus, one can reduce the original testing problem (over alphabet size k) to the much simpler question of estimating the bias of a coin. This latter task is very easy to perform optimally in a locally private manner -for instance it can be completed via RR -and requires each player to send only one bit to the server. Hence, the main technical difficulty is to prove this quite intuitive claim. We do this by showing anticoncentration bounds for a suitable random variable by bounding its fourth moment and invoking the Paley-Zygmund inequality. As a byproduct, we end up establishing a more general version, Theorem 14, which we believe to be of independent interest.
Our information-theoretic lower bounds are all based on a general approach introduced recently by Acharya, Canonne, and Tyagi [ACT18] (in a non-private setting) that allows us to handle the change in distances between distributions when information constraints are imposed on samples. We utilize the by-now-standard "Paninski construction" [Pan08] , a collection C of 2 k/2 distributions obtained by adding a small pointwise perturbation to the k-ary uniform distribution. In order to obtain a lower bound for the sample complexity of locally private uniformity testing, following [ACT18] , we identify such a mechanism to the n noisy channels (W j : [k] → {0, 1} * ) j∈ [n] (that is, the randomized mappings used by the n players) it induces on the samples and consider the distribution W(p) of the tuple of n messages when the underlying distribution of the samples is p. The key step then is to bound the χ 2 divergence between (i) W(u), the distribution of the messages under the uniform distribution; and (ii) E p∈C [W(p)], the average distribution of the messages when p is chosen uniformly at random among the "perturbed distributions."
Using the results of [ACT18] , this in turn is tantamount to obtaining an upper bound the Frobenius norm of specific [k/2] × [k/2] matrices H 1 , . . . , H n that capture the information constraints imposed by W j 's. Deriving these bounds for Frobenius norms constitutes the main technical part of the lower bounds and relies on a careful analysis of the underlying mechanism and of the LDP constraints it must satisfy.
On the range of parameters. As pointed out earlier, in this work we focus on the high-privacy regime, i.e., the case when the privacy parameter ε is small and the privacy constraints on the mechanisms are the most stringent. From a technical standpoint, this allows us to rewrite the expressions such as e ε −1 e ε +1 and e ε/2 −1 e ε/2 +1
Related prior work
Testing properties of a distribution by observing samples from it is a central problem in statistics and has been studied for over a century. Motivated by applications arising from algorithms dealing with massive amounts of data, it has seen renewed interest in the computer science community under the broad title of distribution testing, with a particular focus on sample-optimal algorithms for discrete distributions. This literature itself is over two decades old; we refer an interested reader to surveys and books [Rub12, Can15, Gol17, BW17] for a comprehensive review. Here, we only touch upon works that are related directly to our paper.
Sample complexity for uniformity testing was settled in [Pan08] , following a long line of work. The related, and more general, problem of identity testing has seen revived interest lately. The sample complexity for this problem was shown to be Θ(k 1/2 /γ 2 ) in [VV17] , and by now even the optimal dependence on the error probability is known (cf. [HM13, DGPP16] ). Moreover, a work of Goldreich [Gol16] further shows that any uniformity testing algorithm implies an identity testing one with similar sample complexity. Another variant of this problem, termed "instance-optimal" identity testing and introduced in [VV17] , seeks to characterize the dependence of the sample complexity on the distribution q we are testing identity to, instead of the alphabet size. As pointed out in [ACT18] , the reduction from [Gol16] can be used in conjunction with results from [BCG17] to go through even for the instance-optimal setting. This observation allows us to focus on uniformity testing only, even when local privacy constraints are imposed.
The optimal sample complexity for the independence testing problem where both observations are from the same set 1 [k] was shown to be Θ(k/γ 2 ) in [ADK15, DK16] .
Moving now to distribution testing settings with privacy constraints, the setting of differentially private (DP) testing has by now been extensively studied. Here the algorithm itself is run by a trusted curator who has access to all the user data, but needs to ensure that the output of the test maintains differential privacy. Private identity testing in this sense has been considered in [CDK17, ADR17] , with a complete characterization of sample complexity derived in [ASZ17] . Interestingly, in several parameter ranges of interest the sample complexity here matches the sample complexity for the non-private case discussed earlier, showing that "privacy often comes at no additional cost" in this setting. As we show in this work, this is in stark contrast to what can be achieved in the more stringent locally private setting.
We are not aware of any existing private algorithm for DP independence testing. While the literature on DP testing includes several interesting mechanisms, for instance the works [GLRV16, KR17, WLK15] which contain mechanisms for both identity and independence testing, finite-sample guarantees are not available and the results hold only in the asymptotic regime.
Finally, coming to the literature most closely related to our work, locally private hypothesis testing was considered first by Sheffet in [She18] where, too, both identity and independence testing were considered. This work characterized the sample complexity of LDP independence and uniformity testing when using Randomized Response, and introduced more general mechanisms. However, as pointed-out in Table 1 , the algorithms proposed in [She18] require significantly more samples than our sample-optimal algorithms for those questions. Moreover, the overall sample complexity without restricting to any specific class of mechanisms has not been considered.
An interesting concern studied in Sheffet's work is the distinction between symmetric and asymmetric mechanisms. Broadly speaking, the latter are locally private mechanisms where each player applies the same randomized function W to its data, where asymmetric mechanisms allow different behaviors, with player i using its own W i . While we mention this distinction in our results (see Table 1 ), we observe in Lemma 4 that allowing asymmetric mechanisms can only improve the sample complexity by at most a logarithmic factor.
Another class of problems of statistical inference requires learning the unknown distribution up to a desired accuracy of γ in total variation distance. Clearly, the testing problems we consider can be solved by privately learning the distributions (to accuracy γ). The optimal sample complexity of locally private learning discrete k-ary distributions is known to be Θ(k 2 /(γ 2 ε 2 )); see [DJW17, EPK14, YB17, KBR16, ASZ18] . (Furthermore, all these sample-optimal learning schemes are symmetric.) This readily implies a sample complexity upper bound of O(k 2 /(γ 2 ε 2 )) for locally private identity testing, and of O(k 4 /(γ 2 ε 2 )) for independence testing. In this respect the theoretical guarantees from [She18] are either implied or superseded by this "testing-by-learning" approach.
Notation and Preliminaries
We write [k] for the set of integers {1, 2, . . . , k}, and denote by log and ln the binary and natural logarithms, respectively. We make extensive use of the standard asymptotic O(·), Ω(·), and Θ(·) notation; moreover, we shall sometimes use a n b n , a b n , and a n ≍ b n for their non-asymptotic counterparts (i.e., a n c 1 b n , a c 1 b n , and c 1 a n ≤ b n ≤ c 2 a n for every n, where c 1 , c 2 > 0 are absolute constants).
Following the standard setting of distribution testing, we consider probability distributions over a discrete (and known) domain Ω. Denote by ∆(Ω) the set of all such distributions,
endowed with the total variation distance (statistical distance) as a metric, defined as d TV (p, q) = sup S⊆Ω (p(S) − q(S)). It is easy to see that d TV (p, q) = 1 2 p − q 1 , where p − q 1 is the ℓ 1 distance between p and q as probability mass functions. For a distance parameter γ ∈ (0, 1], we say that
In distribution testing, for a prespecified set of distributions C ⊆ ∆(Ω) and given independent samples from an unknown p ∈ ∆(Ω), our goal is to distinguish between the cases (i) p ∈ C and (ii) p is γ-far from every q ∈ C with constant probability 2 . The sample complexity of testing C is defined as the minimum number of samples required to achieve this task in the worst case over all p ∈ ∆(Ω) (as a function of γ, |Ω|, and all other relevant parameters of C).
The specific problem of identity testing corresponds to Ω = [k] and C = {q} for some fixed and known q ∈ ∆([k]). Uniformity testing is the special case of identity testing with q being the uniform distribution, i.e., q(x) = 1/k for all x ∈ [k]. Lastly, independence testing corresponds to
Local Differential Privacy
We consider the standard setting of ε-local differential privacy, which we recall below. A 1-user mechanism is simply a randomized mapping which, given as input user data x ∈ X , outputs a random variable Z taking values in Z. We represent this mechanism by a channel W : X → Z where W (z | x) denotes the probability that the mechanism outputs z when the user input is x. Similarly, an n-user mechanism is represented by W = (W j : X → Y) j≥0 where W j denotes the channel used for the j-th user; when n is clear from context, we will simply use mechanism for an n-user mechanism. For our purposes, X will be the domain of our discrete probability distributions, [k] , and Z will be identified with {0, 1} ℓ , for some integer ℓ ≥ 0.
Note that each channel W j is applied independently to each user's data. In particular, for independent samples X 1 , . . . , X n , the outputs Z 1 , . . . , Z n of W are independent, too. The mechanisms described above are private-coin mechanisms: they only require independent, local randomness at each user to implement the local channels W 1 , . . . , W n . A private-coin mechanism is further said to be symmetric if W j is the same for all j, in which case, with an abuse of notation, we denote it W : X → Z. A broader class of mechanisms of interest to us are public-coin mechanisms, where the output of each user may depend additionally on shared public randomness U (independent of the users' data); when the shared randomness takes the value u, the mechanism uses channels W u j . Clearly, private-coin mechanisms are a special case, corresponding to constant U . The above distinction between symmetric and asymmetric mechanisms applies to public-coin mechanisms as well.
A public-coin mechanism W is an ε-locally differentially private (ε-LDP) mechanism if it satisfies the following:
Existing LDP mechanisms
Three LDP mechanisms will be of interest to us: randomized response, Rappor, and Hadamard response.
Originally introduced for the binary case (k = 2), it is one of the simplest and most natural response mechanisms.
Rappor. The randomized aggregatable privacy-preserving ordinal response (Rappor) is an ε-LDP mechanism introduced in [DJW13, EPK14] . Its simplest implementation, k-Rappor, maps
First, a one-hot encoding is applied to the input x ∈ [k] to obtain a vector y ∈ {0, 1} k such that y j = 1 for j = x and y j = 0 for j = x. The privatized output, z ∈ Z, of k-Rappor is represented by a k-bit vector obtained by independently flipping each bit of y independently with probability
Note that if x is drawn from p ∈ ∆(k), this leads to z ∈ {0, 1} k such that the coordinates are (non-independent) Bernoulli random variables with
Hadamard Response. Hadamard response is a symmetric, communication-and time-efficient mechanism, proposed in [ASZ18] . In order to define the Hadamard response mechanism, we first define a general family of ε-LDP mechanisms that include RR as a special case. Let s ≤ K be two integers, and for each
be a subset of size with |C x | = s. Then, the general privatization scheme is described by
which can easily be seen to be ε-LDP. Further, note that k-RR corresponds to the special case with K = k, s = 1, and
The Hadamard Response mechanism (HR), is obtained by choosing s = K/2, and a collection of sets (
For these parameters, we get that
Let q(p, C x ) denote the probability that the privatized output z lies in C x , when the input distribution is p. Then, from (A) and (B) it can be seen that
and combining these two
A method for constructing sets (C x ) x∈ [k] that also allows efficient implementation of the resulting mechanism was proposed in [ASZ18] using Hadamard codes (hence the name Hadamard Response). Specifically, let
so that k + 1 ≤ K ≤ 2(k + 1), and let H K ∈ {−1, 1} K×K be the Hadamard matrix of order K (see Section 2.3 for more details). Hereafter, we identify each row of H K to a subset of [K] . As
satisfies (A) and (B).
Hadamard matrices and linear codes
Next, we recall some useful properties of Hadamard matrices which will be needed for our analysis of HR-based tests. 
Note that all entries of H M are in {−1, 1}. (ii) For every j ≥ 2, the j-th row of H 2 m is balanced, i.e, contains exactly 2 m−1 entries equal to 1.
(iii) Every two distinct rows are orthogonal; that is, for every 1 ≤ i < j ≤ 2 m , the i-th and j-th row agree (resp. disagree) on exactly 2 m−1 entries.
Fix any m ≥ 1. The Hadamard matrix H 2 m corresponds to the Walsh-Hadamard transform (or Fourier transform; see, for example, [O'D14]). Specifically, for any two functions
and let · denote the norm induced by this inner product. Moreover, the functions χ S : {0, 1} m → R defined for every S ⊆ [m] by χ S (x) = (−1) x,S = i∈S (−1) x i form an orthonormal basis, whereby every f : {0, 1} m → R can be uniquely written as
wheref (S) := f, χ S . The Walsh-Hadamard matrix specifies this transformation of basis. Specifically, we note following standard fact:
This spectral view of Walsh-Hadamard matrix leads to Parseval's Theorem, which is instrumental in design of our tests based on HR.
Theorem 3 (Parseval's Theorem). For every function
f : {0, 1} m → R, f 2 = S⊆[m]f (S) 2 .
On symmetry and asymmetry
While all the LDP mechanisms underlying our proposed sample-optimal tests in this paper can be cast as symmetric mechanisms, the next result shows that asymmetric mechanisms can in any case yield at most a logarithmic-factor improvement in sample complexity over symmetric ones.
Lemma 4.
Suppose that there exists a private-coin (respectively public-coin) LDP mechanism for some task T with n users and probability of success 5/6. Then, there exists a private-coin (respectively public-coin) symmetric LDP mechanism for T with n ′ = O(n log n) users and probability of success 2/3.
be the purported mechanism, with W i : X → Y being the mapping of the i-th user. We create a symmetric (randomized) mechanismW : X → [n] × Y as follows: On input x ∈ X , use private (respectively public) randomness to generate I ∈ [n] uniformly at random (and independently of everything else); and output (I, W I (x)). 3 Clearly, the resulting mechanism is symmetric. Further, by a standard coupon-collector argument, for n ′ = O(n log n) we have that with probability at least 5/6, each i ∈ [n] will be drawn at least once. Whenever this is the case, upon gathering all the outputs, the referee can then select a subset of n outputs and simulate the original mechanism, having received the output of W 1 , . . . , W n . Overall, the probability of failure is at most 1/6 + 1/6 = 1/3 by a union bound.
A warmup for the binary case
We conclude this section with simple algorithms for identity and independence testing for the case when Ω = {0, 1}, i.e, for support size k = 2. These algorithms will be used later in our optimal tests based on Raptor.
Private estimation of the bias of a coin.
First, we deal with the problem of estimating the bias of a coin up to an additive accuracy of ±γ, when the outcomes of coin tosses can be accessed via an ε-LDP mechanism. Note that this yields as a corollary an algorithm for identity testing over {0, 1}. Indeed, to test if the generating distribution p equals q ∈ ∆({0, 1}) or is γ-far from it, we estimate probability p(0) to additive ±γ/2 and compare it with q(0). The following result is a folklore and is included for completeness.
Lemma 5 (Locally Private Bias Estimation, Warmup). For ε ∈ (0, 1], an estimate of the bias of a coin with an additive accuracy of γ can be obtained using O 1/(γ 2 ε 2 ) samples via ε-LDP RR.
Moreover, any estimate of bias obtained via ε-LDP
Proof. Recall from (2) that an ε-LDP RR is described by the channel
. When a Bern(ρ) random variable passes through this channel, the output is a Bernoulli random variable with mean
Therefore, estimating ρ to ±γ using this mechanism is equivalent to estimating ρ ′ to an additive
e ε −1 γ, which can be done with O(1/γ ′ 2 ) = O(1/(γ 2 ε 2 )) samples (the second as ε 1).
It remains to prove optimality. For k = 2, it can shown that any ε-LDP scheme can be obtained by passing output of an ε-LDP RR through another channel. Therefore, RR will require the least number of samples for estimating the bias, and it suffices to show the claimed bound of Ω 1/(γ 2 ε 2 ) for RR. To that end, suppose we provide as input a Bernoulli random variable with bias 1/2 + γ to RR. Then, the output has bias
On the other hand, when the input is Bern(1/2), then the output is Bern(1/2) as well. Therefore, distinguishing between a Bern(1/2) and a Bern(1/2 + γ) using samples from an ε-LDP RR is at least as hard as distinguishing Bern(1/2) and Bern(1/2 + O(γε)) without privacy constraints. This latter task is known to require the stated number of samples.
Independence testing over
As a corollary of Lemma 5, we obtain an algorithm for locally private independence testing for k = 2, which, too, will be used later in the paper.
Corollary 6. For ε ∈ (0, 1], there exists a symmetric, private-coin ε-LDP mechanism that tests whether a distribution over {0, 1} × {0, 1} is a product distribution or γ-far from any product distribution using O 1/(γ 2 ε 2 ) samples.
Proof. Consider a distribution p over {0, 1} × {0, 1} with marginals p 1 and p 2 . Note that
Thus, if p is γ-far in total variation distance from any product distribution, it must hold that
Using this observation, we can test for independence using O(1/(ε 2 γ 2 )) samples as follows. First, note that for any symbol x, p(x) can be estimated up to an accuracy γ using O(1/(ε 2 γ 2 )) samples by converting the observation X to the binary observation 1 {X=x} and applying the estimator of Lemma 5. Thus, we can estimate p(0, 0), p 1 (0), and p 2 (0) up to an accuracy γ/16 by assigning O(1/(ε 2 γ 2 )) samples each for them. Denote the respective estimates byp(0, 0),p 1 (0), andp 2 (0).
On the other hand, when
Thus, for k = 2, locally private independence testing can be performed with O(1/(ε 2 γ 2 )) samples by estimating the probabilities p(0, 0), p 1 (0), p 2 (0) and comparing |p(0, 0) −p 1 (0)p 2 (0)| to the threshold γ/4.
Locally Private Uniformity Testing using Existing Mechanisms
In this section, we provide two locally private mechanisms for uniformity testing. As discussed earlier, this in turn provides similar mechanisms for identity testing as well. These two tests, based respectively on the symmetric, private-coin mechanisms Rappor and HR, will be seen to have the same sample complexity of O(k 3/2 /γ 2 ε 2 ). However, the first has the advantage of being based on a widespread mechanism, while the second is more efficient in terms of both time and communication.
A mechanism based on Rappor
Given n independent samples from p, let the output of Rappor applied to these samples be denoted by
The following fact is a simple consequence of the definition of Rappor.
, and x, y ∈ [k].
First idea: Counting Collisions. A natural idea would be to try and estimate p 2 2 by counting the collisions from the output of Rappor. Since this only adds post-processing to Rappor, which is LDP, the overall procedure does not violate the ε-LDP constraint. For σ x i,j defined as
i,j counting collisions over all samples and differentially private symbols can be seen to have expectation
Up to the constant normalizing factor, this suggests an unbiased estimator for p 2 2 , and thereby also for p − u 2 2 = p 2 2 − 1/k. However, the issue lies with the variance of this estimator. Indeed, it can be shown that Var(S) ≈ n 3 k (for constant ε). Thus, if we use this statistic to distinguish between p 2 2 = 1/k and p 2 2 > (1 + Ω(γ 2 ))/k for uniformity testing, we need
. This sample requirement turns out to be off by a quadratic factor, and even worse than the trivial upper bound obtained by learning p.
An Optimal Mechanism. We now propose our testing mechanism based on Rappor, which, in essence, uses a privatized version of a χ 2 -type statistic of [CDVV14, ADK15, VV17] . For x ∈ [k], let the number of occurrences of x among the n (privatized) outputs of Rappor be
which by the definition of Rappor follows a Bin(n, α R p(x) + β R ) distribution. Now, letting
we get a statistic, applied to the output of Rappor, which (as we shall see) is up to normalization an unbiased estimator for the squared ℓ 2 distance of p to uniform. The main difference with the naive approach we discussed previously, however, lies in the extra linear term. Indeed, the collision-based statistic was of the form
and in comparison, keeping in mind that N x is typically concentrated around its expected value of roughly n/2, our new statistics can be seen to take the form
since β R ≈ 1/2. That is, now the fluctuations of the quadratic term are reduced significantly by the subtracted linear term, bringing down the variance of the statistic. This motivates our testing algorithm based on Rappor, Algorithm 4, and leads to the main result of this section:
], Algorithm 4 based on ε-LDP Rappor can test whether a distribution is uniform or γ-far from uniform using
samples.
Algorithm 4 Locally Private Uniformity Testing using Rappor
Require: Privacy parameter ε > 0, distance parameter γ ∈ (0, 1), n samples 1: Set
e ε/2 + 1 as in (3).
2: Apply (ε-LDP) Rappor to the n samples to obtain (
return uniform 7: else 8: return not uniform 9: end if Proof of Theorem 8. Clearly, since Rappor is an ε-LDP mechanism, the overall Algorithm 4 does not violate the ε-LDP constraint. We now analyze the error performance of the proposed test, which we will do simply by using Chebyshev's inequality. Towards that, we evaluate the expected value and the variance of T .
The following evaluation of expected value of statistic T uses a simple calculation entailing moments of a Binomial random variable: Lemma 9. With T defined as above, we have
where the expectation is taken over the private-coins used by Rappor and the samples drawn from
which, along with the observation that 
The proof of this lemma is quite technical and relies on a tedious analysis of the covariance of the random variables (N x ) x∈ [k] , in view of bounding quantities of the form Cov(f (N x ), f (N y )). We defer the details to Appendix B.
With these two lemmata, we are in a position to conclude the argument. Suppose n ≥ C · k 3/2 α 2 R γ 2 , for some constant C > 0 to be specified later. Recall that α R = ε/4 + o(ε) when ε → 0, leading to the claimed sample complexity.
First, consider the case when p = u. In this case E[T ] = 0 and Var(T ) ≤ 4kn 2 by Lemmas 9 and 10, and so by Chebyshev's inequality
which is at most 1/3 for C ≥ 3.
and Var(T ) ≤ 4kn 2 + 8nE[T ], and again by Chebyshev's inequality
which is at most 1/3 for C ≥ 23. Taking C = 23 concludes the proof of Theorem 8.
A mechanism based on Hadamard Response
Although the Rappor-based mechanism of Section 3.1 achieves a significantly improved sample complexity over the naive learning-and-testing approach, it suffers several shortcomings. The most apparent is its time complexity: inherently, the one-hot encoding procedure used in Rappor leads to a time complexity of Θ(kn), with an extra linear dependence on the alphabet size k, which is far from the "gold standard" of O(n) complexity. A more time-efficient procedure is obtained using HR. In fact, we describe an algorithm for testing uniformity based on HR that has the same sample complexity as the one based on Rappor described above, but is much more time-efficient. 
Algorithm 5 Locally Private Uniformity Testing using Hadamard Response
Require: Privacy parameter ε > 0, distance parameter γ ∈ (0, 1), n samples
Apply the HR (with parameters ε, K) to the n samples to obtain n independent samples in
Invoke the testing algorithm Test-ℓ 2 of Theorem 13 on these n samples, with parameters return not uniform 8: end if
To describe the intuition behind this algorithm, suppose we feed inputs from an input distribution p ∈ ∆([k]) to the more general mechanism in Section 2.2, whose output then follows some induced distribution q ∈ ∆([K]). A natural hope is that whenever p is uniform (over [k]), then q is uniform (over [K]), too; and that conversely if p is not uniform, then q is neither, and that the distance to uniformity is preserved. This is not exactly what we will obtain. However, we can get something close to it in the next result, which suffices for our purpose. 4
Theorem 12. Let ε ∈ (0, 1], K = O(k) be a power of 2, and denote by q the output distribution over [K] . Then, we have
where α H := Thus, when p = u, we get q = q * . Otherwise when d TV (p, u) > γ, then
The observation above suggests that if we can estimate the ℓ 2 distance between q and q * , we can get our desired uniformity test. We facilitate this by invoking the result below, which follows from the ℓ 2 -distance estimation algorithm of [CDVV14, We apply the algorithm of Theorem 13 to our case by generating desired number of samples from q * , which can simply be obtained by passing samples from the uniform distribution via HR, and using them along with the samples observed from q at the output of HR. We need to distinguish between the cases q = q * and q − q * 2 > γ ′ / √ K, which by the previous result can be done using O( q * 2 K/γ ′2 ) samples where
, the number of samples we need is
which is our claimed sample complexity.
The time complexity follows from the efficiency of Hadamard encoding (see [ASZ18, Section 4.1]), which allows each player to generate their private sample in time O(log K) = O(log k), and to send only O(log k) bits. 6 After this, running the Test-ℓ 2 algorithm takes time O(n log K + n log n), the first term being the time required to generate n samples from q * . Thus, to conclude the proof of Theorem 11, it only remains to establish Theorem 12 -which we do next.
Proof of Theorem 12. For any
Then, from Eq. (4) (recalling that s = K/2) we get
Define
Note that we may view a probability distribution p ∈ ∆([k]) as a function p : {0, 1} k → R with
where we identify s ∈ {0, 1} k with the subset
and use the two notations interchangeably. Also, from Fact 2 and the definition of the C x as sets encoded by the rows of the matrix H K , we have that
Now, consider the function g :
Using the previous equation, we can view g alternatively as
which by Parseval's theorem (Theorem 3) gives
The identity above, together with (16), yields 
Optimal Locally Private Uniformity Testing
In the foregoing treatment, we saw that existing (private-coin) mechanisms such as Rappor and HR can perform uniformity testing using O(k 3/2 /(γ 2 ε 2 )) samples at best. In this section, we describe our public-coin mechanism, Raptor, 8 and use it to design an algorithm for testing uniformity that requires only O(k/(γ 2 ε 2 )) samples and constant communication 9 per sample.
Our algorithm builds upon the warmup algorithm of Lemma 5, which allows us to perform uniformity testing for k = 2 using O(1/(γ 2 ε 2 )) samples. Specifically, we use public randomness to reduce the uniformity testing problem for an arbitrary k to that for k = 2, albeit with γ replaced with γ/ √ k; and then apply the warmup algorithm. To enable the aforementioned reduction, we need to show that the probabilities of a randomly generated set differ appropriately under the uniform distribution and a distribution that is γ far from uniform in total variation distance. To accomplish this, we prove a more general result which might be of independent interest. We say that random variables X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X k are 4-symmetric if E[X i 1 X i 2 X i 3 X i 4 ] depends only on the number of times each element appears in the multiset {i 1 , i 2 , i 3 , i 4 }. 10 The following result constitutes a concentration bound for Z = i∈ [k] δ i X i for a probability perturbation δ.
Theorem 14 (Probability perturbation concentration). Consider a vector δ such that
The proof requires a careful evaluation of the second and the fourth moments of Z and is deferred to Appendix A. As a corollary, we obtain the result below, which is at the core of our reduction argument.
Corollary 15. Consider a distribution p ∈ ∆([k]) such that d TV (p, u) > γ. For a random subset S of [k] distributed uniformly over all subsets of [k] of cardinality k/2, it holds that
Proof. Let Y 1 , . . . , Y k be independent random bits, and let X 1 , . . . , X k be obtained by conditioning
Consider the random set S defined as Note that E X 2 1 = E X 4 1 = 1/2. Also,
which by symmetry yields
Taking the average of the right-side, we get
Finally, note that Armed with this result, we can divide our LDP testing problem into two parts: A public-coin ε-LDP mechanism releases 1-bit per sample to the curator, and the curator applies a test to the received bits to accomplish uniformity testing. This specific mechanism suggested by the previous corollary is our Raptor (see Section 1.1 for a description). While in this paper we have only considered its use for testing uniformity and independence, since it provides locally private 1-bit outputs that, in essence, preserve the ℓ 2 distance of the underlying distribution from any other fixed one, we can foresee many other use-cases for Raptor and pose it as a standalone mechanism of independent interest.
Recall that in Raptor the curator and the users pick a random subset S of size k/2 from their shared randomness, and each user sends the indicator function that its input lies in this set S using ε-LDP RR. This is precisely the 1-bit information from samples required to enable the estimator of Lemma 5. Note that when the underlying distribution p is uniform, the probability p(S) of user bit being 1 is exactly 1/2. Also, by Corollary 15 when p is γ-far from uniform we have p(S) = 1/2 ± Ω(γ/ √ k) with a constant probability (over the choice of S); by repeating the protocol a constant number of times, 11 we can ensure that with high constant probability at least one of the choices of S will indeed have this property. Therefore, we obtain an instance of the uniformity testing problem for k = 2, namely the problem of privately distinguishing a Bern(1/2) from Bern 1/2 ± c 1 γ √ k
. Thus, when we apply Raptor to the samples, the curator gets the 1-bit updates required by Lemma 5 to which it can apply the estimator prescribed in Lemma 5 to solve the underlying uniformity testing instance for k = 2 using O k γ 2 (e ε + 1) 2 (e ε − 1) 2 samples. Since we used ε-LDP RR to send each bit, Raptor, too, is ε-LDP and thereby so is our overall uniformity test. We summarize the overall algorithm and its performance below.
Theorem 16. For ε ∈ (0, 1], Algorithm 6 based on ε-LDP Raptor can test whether a distribution is uniform or γ-far from uniform using
Algorithm 6 Locally Private Uniformity Testing using Raptor Require: Privacy parameter ε > 0, distance parameter γ ∈ (0, 1), n = mT samples
2: for t from 1 to T do ⊲ In parallel
3:
Generate uniformly at random a subset S t of [k] of cardinality k/2
4:
Apply Raptor using S t to each sample in the mini-batch of m samples
5:
Use the estimator in the proof of Lemma 5 to test with probability of failure δ if p(S t ) = 1/2 (unbiased) or |p(S t ) − 1/2| > γ ′ (biased) . By a standard amplification argument, 12 one can amplify the success probability of 11 To preserve the symmetry of our mechanism, we note that this can be done "in parallel" at each user. That is, each user considers the same T = Θ(1) many random subsets, and sends their corresponding T privatized (with parameter ε ′ = ε/T ) indicator bits to the curator. 12 Namely, letting the server divide the received samples into O(log(1/δ)) disjoint batches, and running the private estimation procedure of Lemma 5 independently T times, before outputting the majority vote.
the private estimation procedure of Lemma 5 to 1 − δ, using a total of O(log(1/δ)/(γ ′ 2 ε 2 )) = O(1/(γ ′ 2 ε 2 )) samples (to achieve privacy ε and accuracy γ ′ ).
Consider the t-th test from Algorithm 6 (where 1 ≤ t ≤ T ), and let b t be the indicator that the bias estimation outputs unbiased. If p is uniform, then by the above we have Pr[ b t = 1 ] ≥ 1 − δ (where the probability is over the choice of the random subset S t , and the randomness of the bias estimation). However, if p is γ-far from uniform, by Corollary 15 it it the case that Pr[
2 ). Therefore, for a sufficiently large constant in the choice of T = Θ(1/c 2 ) = Θ(1), a Chernoff bound argument ensures that we can distinguish between these two cases with probability at least 2/3.
Proofs of Optimality: Lower Bounds for Uniformity Testing
We now establish that the public-coin testing algorithm in the previous section has optimal samplecomplexity for any LDP uniformity testing algorithm. Furthermore, we establish lower bounds on the sample complexity for any LDP testing algorithm using Rappor or HR, showing that the tests we proposed using these mechanisms are sample optimal (up to constant factors) in their class.
Lower bound for public-coin mechanisms
We first show that any uniformity testing algorithm that uses data from an ε-LDP public-coin mechanism (which includes private-coin mechanisms) requires at least Ω k/(γ 2 ε 2 ) samples.
Theorem 17. For ε ∈ (0, 1], any ε-LDP public-coin mechanism for uniformity testing must use
Proof. Our lower bound relies on analyzing the standard "Paninski construction" [Pan08] , which we briefly recall. Assuming without loss of generality that k is even, we partition the domain in k/2 consecutive pairs (2i − 1, 2i). For a given parameter γ ∈ (0, 1/2], the family of "no-instances" is the collection of 2 k/2 distributions (p θ ) θ∈{−1,+1} k/2 where
Note that every such p θ is a total variation exactly γ from the uniform distribution on [k].
Our starting point will be the proof of the public-coin lower bound of [ACT18, Theorem 6.1] for uniformity testing in a (non-private) distributed setting. Note that the proof in [ACT18] proceeds by noting that once we restrict our attention to the hypothesis testing problem implied by Paninski's construction, we can derandomize and find a deterministic protocol that outperforms the publiccoin protocol. Therefore, it suffices to bound the performance of deterministic protocols. However, in our current application, relaxing to deterministic protocols will get rid of local privacy constraints and will not lead to useful bounds. Instead, we note in similar vein as the proof in [ACT18] that we can derandomize public randomness and find a private-coin ε-LDP protocol that achieves the same performance for Paninski's construction as the public-coin protocol we start with. Therefore, it suffices to restrict our attention to private-coin protocols.
Let W be an arbitrary ε-LDP private-coin mechanism for uniformity testing. For 1 ≤ j ≤ n and θ, θ ′ ∈ {−1, +1} k/2 , define H j (θ, θ ′ ) as
where m ∈ ({0, 1} * ) n denotes the tuple of outputs from the n users. Let
i.e.,W j (m) is the probability of user j outputting m when the input distribution is uniform. Let
Then by the conditions for LDP, we must have
Furthermore, we can rewrite
where H j is an [k/2] × [k/2] matrix with (i 1 , i 2 )th entry equal to
By using that mW j (m) = 1, we further get that
For a given distribution p ∈ ∆([k]), denote by W(p) ∈ ∆(({0, 1} * ) n ) the product distribution over m (the tuple of n messages) when each user gets an independent sample from p. In [ACT18] , it is shown that, with n users, the χ 2 distance between the distributions of (i) the output of the mechanism under the Paninski mixture,
θ W(p θ ), and (ii) the output of the mechanism under the uniform distribution W yes := W(u), is bounded by
We will also rely on the following technical claim: k 2 we obtain the following upper bound on the distance between the distributions of the output of the mechanisms in the two cases:
This implies the claimed lower bound by a standard application of Le Cam's two-point method (as e.g. detailed by Pollard [Pol03] ), as one must have n = Ω(k/(ε 2 γ 2 )) for the RHS to be Ω(1).
Lower bound for Rappor
In this section, we prove a lower bound for any uniformity testing mechanism that uses Rappor, not only the algorithm from Section 3.1 (Theorem 8). In fact, the next result shows that that algorithm requires the least number of samples (up to constant factors) among all mechanisms based on the output Rappor, even those allowing public-coin protocols in their post-processing stage.
Theorem 19. In the high-privacy regime, any ε-LDP mechanism for uniformity testing that uses
Rappor for reporting user data must use
Proof. We once again take recourse to Pollard's recipe and proceed as in the proof of Theorem 17. Denote by W : [k] → {0, 1} k the channel from the input to the output of Rappor. Letting for conciseness q ε := e ε /(1 + e ε ), we first observe that for any observation i ∈ [k] one has
where m(0) and m(1), respectively, denote the number of 0's and 1's in m. As was seen in the previous proof of lower bound, for our purpose, we need to
For the former quantity, we have
For the latter, we have
We are now in a position to prove the lower bound. We are considering protocols where each sample X j is reported to the center using Rappor, and so, each sample is reported using the same channel W described above. Therefore, the k × k matrix H j used in the previous proof does not depend on j and satisfies
It follows that
The key observation that facilitates our bound is that for i 1 = i 2 , the sum on the right-side is 0. Indeed, consider the set of messages of fixed type, namely those with m(0) and m(1) fixed. Note that in any such set, only messages with m 2i 1 = m 2i 1 −1 and m 2i 2 = m 2i 2 −1 contribute to the sum. Furthermore, for any fixed m 2i 2 = m 2i 2 −1 , the contributions corresponding to m 2i 1 = 1, m 2i 1 −1 = 0 and m 2i 1 = 0, m 2i 1 −1 = 1 negate each other when i 1 = i 2 , whereby the overall sum is 0. Thus, we have
where the inequality holds since m(1)e 2ε + m(0) ≥ k for every ε ≥ 0. It follows that
2 , establishing the result.
Lower bound for Hadamard Response
Finally, we establish the analogue of Theorem 19 for any mechanism based on Hadamard Response.
Theorem 20. In the high-privacy regime, any ε-LDP mechanism for uniformity testing that uses HR for reporting user data must use
Proof. The proof follows the same outline as the proof of Theorem 19 -we show once again that the matrix H corresponding to using HR for reporting each users data is a diagonal matrix. Specifically, considering the set of messages as {0, . . . , K − 1} and the inputs as {0, . . . k − 1} for convenience, the matrix H in the proof of lower bound is given by
where W (m | i) denotes the probability that HR outputs m when the input is i and is given by
With a slight abuse of notation, we use m and i interchangeably to denote their values and the binary vectors corresponding to binary representation of those values. Further, let x, y = ⊕ x i y i denote the standard (parity) inner product for vectors over F 2 . With this convention, for HR we have
Note that for m = 0 and every i, 1 {m∈C i } = 1, which implies that W (0 | i) is the same for all i. It follows that the term corresponding to m = 0 in the expression for H(i 1 , i 2 ) is 0. Moreover, using
We claim that H(i 1 , i 2 ) = 0 for i 1 = i 2 . Indeed, a case analysis yields
where the condition 1 { m,1 =0} indicates that the expression is nonzero only when m is odd. Thus, the summands in (17) can be restricted to odd m, and further, each summand equals
We can simplify the expression on the right-side by noting that each odd m has the binary form (b, 1) and (b, 1), 2i = b, i . Hence,
since for any nonzero vector j, | { m : m, j = 0 } | = | { m : m, j = 1 } | . In summary, we have
The proof is completed in the same manner as the proof of Theorem 19.
Independence Testing
In this section, we treat independence testing. We begin in Section 6.1 with an independence testing mechanism based on HR that does not require public randomness and which achieves significantly improved sample complexity over the state-of-the-art (in dependence on the alphabet size). However, we do not have matching lower bounds for its performance. Then, in Section 6.2, we describe and analyze an optimal procedure that uses public randomness, akin to the optimal uniformity testing mechanism of Section 4.
A mechanism based on Hadamard Response and private χ 2 learning
We present a symmetric, private-coin LDP mechanism for testing independence of distributions over [k] × [k] (although, as we note in Remark 1, our mechanism can be easily extended to handle a more general setting).
Theorem 21. For ε ∈ (0, 1], Algorithm 7 based on a symmetric private-coin ε-LDP mechanism can test whether a distribution over [k] × [k] is a product distribution or γ-far from product using
The rest of this section is dedicated to the proof of Theorem 21. The argument will follow the "testing-by-hybrid-learning" approach of [ADK15] , modified suitably for the local differential privacy setting. Specifically, instead of learning and testing the underlying user data distributions, we simply do this in the Fourier domain for the distributions seen at the output of HR; details follow.
Denote by H the HR mapping from [k] to [K] , where K = O(k), and α H := e ε −1 e ε +1 as in Section 3.2. For any probability distribution
as the distribution of (Z 1 , Z 2 ) obtained by the process below:
(1) Draw (X 1 , X 2 ) from p;
(2) apply HR independently to X 1 and X 2 to obtain Z 1 and Z 2 .
It is immediate to see that if p is a product distribution with marginals p 1 and p 2 , then
We build our test on observations (Z 1 , Z 2 ) from each user, with distribution T (p). Our proposed test uses these samples. It builds on several components that we will describe later; for ease of presentation, we summarize the overall algorithm in Algorithm 7. For Section 6.1, we rely on a result of [ADK15] , modified slightly for our purposes: 13
Theorem 22 ([ADK15, Theorem 1]). Given the explicit description of a distribution
and samples from an unknown distribution p ∈ ∆([k]), there exists an efficient algorithm with that can distinguish with probability at least 9/10 between the cases χ 2 (p, q) <
In addition to Theorem 22, our proposed algorithm builds on Corollary 27 which we will describe and prove below. But before we prove this result, we note that this algorithm can be seen to satisfy all the properties claimed in Theorem 21. Indeed, it requires O(k 3 /(α 4 H γ 2 )); its privacy is immediate since the observations at the curator are obtained by passing user data via HR. The mechanism is clearly symmetric, as each user sends the output of HR (applied independently to both marginal of their data) to the curator -it is only at the curator that these privatized outputs are used and combined to generate samples from
As for the correctness, it will follow from Corollary 27 and Theorem 22 (ensuring that the algorithm is overall correct with probability at least 7/10 > 2/3), once the following structural property is established: For p that is γ-far from any product distribution has χ 2 (T (p), q) > γ ′ 2 . Formally, we show the following:
It only remains to establish the structural property above and χ 2 learning algorithm Corollary 27.
Proof of structural result Theorem 23. We prove that (i) if p is independent, then χ 2 (T (p 1 ⊗ p 2 ), q) will be small, while (ii) if p is far from independent then χ 2 (T (p 1 ⊗ p 2 ), q) must be noticeably larger. The key technical component is the next lemma. 
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 12. Note that it follows in the manner of (14) that 
The last point follows from the fact that 
Optimal independence testing using public-coin mechanisms
We proceed, as for uniformity testing, by reducing independence testing for arbitrary k to that for k = 2; an algorithm for solving the latter problem is given as a warmup in Corollary 6. We show
with constant probability. Therefore, we can perform our independence test by repeating the mechanism of Corollary 6 O(1) times, each for independently generated S 1 , S 2 applied to O(k 2 /(γ 2 ε 2 )) samples. Indeed, the claim above guarantees that, with high constant probability, when d TV (p, p 1 ⊗ p 2 ) ≥ γ, one of the O(1) repetitions will produce sets S 1 , S 2 that satisfy (18). On the other hand, clearly
. Thus, the mechanism described in Corollary 6 will allow us to perform independence testing using O(k 2 /(γ 2 ε 2 )) samples by obtaining first the estimatesp,p 1 , andp 2 , respectively, of p(S 1 × S 2 ), p 1 (S 1 ), and p 2 (S 2 ), and then comparing |p −p 1p2 | with a suitable threshold. 15
Hence, we can (as we did for uniformity testing) divide the LDP testing problem into two parts: A public-coin ε-LDP mechanism releases 3 bits per sample to the curator, and then the curator applies a test to the received bits to perform independence testing on the reduced domain {0, 1} × {0, 1}. The specific mechanism underlying the first part will be Raptor (specifically, a bivariate variant of Raptor given in Algorithm 8); the second part relies on the estimator of Corollary 6. As in Section 4, we can boost the probability of success to 2/3 by performing the above two-part test a constant number of times and using the median trick.
Algorithm 8
The Raptor mechanism, bivariate version 1: The curator and the users sample two independent and uniformly random subsets S 1 , S 2 of [k] of cardinality k/2.
2: Each user computes the three bit indicators
and sends them using RR, i.e., flips each of them independently with probability 1/(1 + e ε/3 ) and sends the outcome to the curator. ⊲ Parameter ε/3 to obtain ε-LDP of the joint 3 bits.
It only remains to prove the claim (18). This requires the following (somewhat technical) extension of Theorem 14; for simplicity, we provide a less general version that addresses only a specific choice of random variables X and Y .
Theorem 28 (Joint probability perturbation concentration). Consider a matrix δ ∈ R k×k such that, for
We provide the details of the proof of Theorem 28 in Appendix C. In particular, choosing
, we obtain the desired result as a corollary: 
and that
Thus, the claim follows from Theorem 28.
Finally, we show that the sample requirement for our mechanism is optimal for ε ∈ (0, 1]. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 17, since the uniform distribution on [k] × [k] is also a product distribution. The only caveat is that we need to ensure that each perturbed distribution is at total variation distance at least γ from every product distribution, not only the uniform one. Fortunately, we can get this using the following simple fact:
Consequently, to show that the perturbed distribution is γ-far from independent it is enough to prove it is (3γ)-far from the product of its marginals, which in turn is immediate. This implies that locally private independence testing is information-theoretically at least as hard as locally private uniformity testing over [k]×[k] (i.e., over alphabet size k 2 ), yielding the Ω k 2 /(γ 2 ε 2 ) sample lower bound. In summary, combining the upper and lower bounds we have shown the following result. 
A Proof of Theorem 14
Theorem 32 (Probability perturbation concentration, restated). Consider a vector δ such that Note first that
Moreover, for the variance of Z, we have
where we used i∈ [k] δ i = 0 in the previous identity. It follows from Chebyshev's inequality that
For the lower tail bound, we derive a bound for E Z 4 and invoke the Paley-Zygmund inequality. Specifically, we have
where we have abbreviated
The expressions for Σ's above can be simplified further by using i∈ [k] δ i = 0. Observe now that
Also, for Σ 2,1 and Σ 2,2 , we obtain
Finally, the expressions for Σ's can be seen to satisfy,
Combining the relations above, we obtain Note that by symmetry
and by symmetry and the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality
Therefore, the previous inequality yields
We now take recourse to the Paley-Zygmund inequality, restated below:
Theorem 33 (Paley-Zygmund (Refined version)). Suppose U is a non-negative random variable with finite variance. Then, for every θ ∈ [0, 1],
Applying this to Z 2 and substituting the bounds of Eqs. (20) and (21) above, and setting
,
which completes the proof.
B Proof of Lemma 10
Lemma 34 (Variance of the Rappor-based estimator, restated). With T defined as in (10), we have
Proof of Lemma 10. Letting again λ :=
The key difficulty in analysis arises from the fact that Rappor renders the multiplicities N x 's dependent random variable. They are negatively associated, but since f is not monotone this does not imply that the cross covariance terms are non-positive. Thus, we need to take recourse to a more direct, elaborate treatment.
Fix x = y in [k] . Expanding the covariance term, recalling E[f (N x )] = n(n − 1)(λ x − λ) 2 from the proof of Lemma 9 and abbreviating r := 2(n − 1)λ + 1 and m := n − 1, we obtain after a few manipulations that
Substituting r − 1 = 2mλ and
2 in the previous identity, and similarly for N x , we get
We proceed by evaluating the expressions for
Specifically, by Fact 7, we get
Turning to E N 2 x N y , we get
For the last term, note that 
C Proof of Theorem 28
Theorem 35 (Joint probability perturbation concentration, restated). Up to this point, our calculations are valid for any independent choice of 4-symmetric (X 1 , . . . , X k ) and (Y 1 , . . . , Y k ). For our specific choice, using calculations from the proof of Corollary 15, we obtain the following:
It remains to bound the fourth moment of Z; for simplicity, we provide this proof only for our specific choice of random variables. We have where we have once again used j 3 δ i 3 ,j 3 = 0 to obtain the last line from the second-to-last. This leaves us with terms of the form j 1 ,j 2 p 2 (j 1 , j 2 ) 1 − p 3 (j 1 , j 2 ) 1 + q 4 (j 1 , j 2 ) (δ i 1 j 1 δ i 2 j 2 δ i 3 j 1 δ i 4 j 1 + δ i 1 j 1 δ i 2 j 2 δ i 3 j 2 δ i 4 j 1 ) .
Finally, splitting the summation above into terms with j 1 = j 2 and j 1 = j 2 , we end up with terms of the form (27). Note that the resulting coefficients α k , β k entail terms dependent on k which can be handled and bounded (crucially, independently of k) in the manner of proof of Corollary 15.
To complete the proof, we handle each term in (27) separately. For the first, we obtain 
